A conflict correspondent recently stated that Iranian politicians — including the president — have “no say” in strategic affairs like foreign and security policy. The core insight is sound. The framing is misleading.

Here’s what the sources actually show.

The claim

Quoted directly:

“Political figures in Iran are responsible on running state affairs and ‘non-strategic’ affairs. But when it comes to strategic affairs, such as the country’s foreign and security policies, politicians don’t have a say, including the president who according to the constitution is the number two in charge.”

Two factual sub-claims:

1. The president is constitutionally number two in charge.
2. Politicians (including the president) have no say in strategic/security/foreign policy.

Verdict on claim 1: MOSTLY TRUE Verdict on claim 2: MISLEADING

Claim 1: Constitutional rank

Article 113 of the Iranian Constitution states:

“After the office of Leadership, the President is the highest official in the country.”

That holds. But “number two” obscures the distribution of specific powers. Article 110 assigns the Supreme Leader: Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, appointing heads of the judiciary and state media, declaring war and peace, setting general policy direction. The president’s executive authority operates within those constraints, not alongside them.

Claim 2: “No say” in strategic affairs

This is where the claim becomes misleading.

Article 176 gives the president a formal seat at the table that matters: chairmanship of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) — the body that coordinates security policy. The SNSC’s decisions require the Supreme Leader’s approval, so the president doesn’t hold final authority. But “no say” and “no final authority” are not the same thing.

The JCPOA negotiations [2013-2015] are a direct counter-example: the president’s team ran the negotiations. Khamenei authorized and could have killed the process at any point, and ultimately he did kill its continuation. But the diplomatic machinery — the specific terms, the sequencing, the communications with European mediators — was driven by the president’s office.

Presidential influence has varied significantly by individual:

President	Period	Strategic influence
Rafsanjani	1989–1997	Significant
Khatami	1997–2005	Marginalized on security
Ahmadinejad	2005–2013	Initially aligned, later clashed with Khamenei
Rouhani	2013–2021	Led JCPOA negotiations
Raisi	2021–2024	Closely aligned, minimal friction
Pezeshkian	2024–present	Reformist, limited leverage

The pattern undermines a blanket “no say” claim. Presidential influence fluctuates with political conditions, personal relationships, and the specific policy domain.

The dual-state structure

The accurate framing is not exclusion — it’s asymmetric participation:

Formal (elected) state:

• President, cabinet, parliament
• Manages economy, social policy, day-to-day governance
• Formal seat in security coordination (SNSC)

Revolutionary (unelected) state:

• Supreme Leader’s office (Beyt-e Rahbari)
• IRGC — military, intelligence, economic empire
• Guardian Council — candidate vetting, legislative review
• Judiciary — appointed by Supreme Leader

The IRGC’s Quds Force historically ran its own foreign policy in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon — often bypassing the Foreign Ministry entirely. That’s not politicians having no say; it’s a parallel system operating alongside elected institutions, sometimes in coordination, sometimes not.

What the claim gets right

The Supreme Leader holds final authority on all strategic matters. The president cannot override, redirect, or survive sustained conflict with the Supreme Leader on security or foreign policy. That asymmetry is real and constitutionally embedded.

The claim also correctly identifies that Pezeshkian specifically has limited leverage — as a reformist president facing a hardline security establishment, his ability to influence IRGC operations is near zero.

What it gets wrong

“No say” conflates two distinct things:

• No final authority (true)
• No participation or influence (false — historically and constitutionally)

The MISLEADING verdict applies: the claim uses true premises (Supreme Leader has final authority, IRGC dominates security policy) to imply a false conclusion (elected officials are completely excluded from strategic decisions).